Passenger safetyand very large transportation aircraft F uture Very Large Transport Aircraft (VLTA) represent an exciting and important development in civil aviation. The emergency evacuation of VLTAs in the event of a survivable crash poses a challenge for aircraft manufacturers and certification authorities.
The information which has been gained from previous evacuation research has been re-evaluated for VLTA. This included consideration of the aircraft configuration, crew factors and passenger issues.
Background
Aviation has achieved a remarkable safety record, making it currently the safest form of mass transportation in the world today. Since the introduction of commercial jet transportation in the 1950s, there have been tremendous improvements. Within a period of 30 years, the hull-loss accident rate has reduced from 28 per million departures to 1.3 per million departures. This constituted an impressive decrease of 95%. During this period, steps have been taken by the Joint Airworthiness Authorities, the Federal Aviation Administration and Transport Canada to reduce the number of fatalities. Improvements have included the introduction of floor proximity lighting, fire-blocking materials in seats, smoke detectors in the cargo bay and toilets, and additional space adjacent to exits. The behaviour of passengers and their impact on emergency evacuations has also come under scrutiny since it is believed that with a comprehensive understanding of behaviour in highly stressful and disorientating conditions, steps could be taken to improve the probability of a successful evacuation of all of the passengers from the aircraft.
The challenge for the development of the future Very Large Transport Aircraft (VLTA) will be to ensure that with a passenger load of over 400, together with a cabin interior which will include innovative features, the currently high standards of safety which have been achieved in the past can be maintained.
Passenger Survival Factors
Whilst no two accidents can ever be the same, it is possible to learn from the similarities and differences between the causes of the accidents, their location and the environmental conditions present, the types of passengers onboard and their responses to the emergency. For instance, there were many similarities between the accident at Manchester in 1985 1 and the one which occurred at Calgary in 1984 2 , in that they were both caused by an engine fire at take-off. However, they differed in one important respect, namely that at Manchester there were 55 fatalities, whereas in Calgary everyone survived. We know that in some aircraft accidents everyone files out of the plane in a rapid although orderly manner, for example, in the evacuation of a British Airways 747 at Los Angeles in 1987 3 as a result of a bomb scare. In other accidents, however, the orderly process breaks down and confusion in the cabin can lead to blockages in the aisles and at exits, with a consequent loss of life 1 .
In 1989 Muir 4 suggested that one of the primary reasons for the differences in behaviour between the orderly and disorderly situations arose from the motivation of individual passengers. She suggested that in some accidents, as in the aircraft certification evacuations, all of the passengers assume that the objective is to get everyone out of the aircraft as quickly as possible, and they therefore all work collaboratively. In other emergencies, however, the motivation of individual passengers could be very different, especially in the presence of smoke and fire. In a situation where an immediate threat to life is perceived, rather than all passengers being motivated to help each other, the main objective which governs their behaviour becomes survival for themselves, and in some instances, members of their family. In this situation, when the primary survival instinct takes over, people do not work collaboratively. This can lead to the evacuation becoming very disorganised, with some individuals competing to get through the exits. The behaviour observed in the accident which occurred at Manchester 1 , and other accidents, including the fire at Bradford City UK 5 supports this interpretation.
The findings from the accident data suggest that in the evaluation of the safety and egress capability of future VLTAs, consideration of airframe configurational issues, crew factors and individual passenger behaviour must be included.
Configurational Issues
The following configurational issues will require consideration for future VLTAs.
Size, Location and Access to Exits
The current regulation which stipulates that the maximum number of passengers that can be carried is dependent on the number and types of exits available on each side of the fuselage will apply to VLTAs 6, 7 . For passenger seating configurations of more than 110 seats, the emergency exits in each side of the fuselage must include at least two Type I or larger exits. Each emergency exit must be easily accessible, and must also meet the requirements in terms of exit arrangement, assist means, escape routes, exit marking and emergency lighting. All passenger emergency exits should be distributed throughout the cabin as uniformly as practicable, taking into account passenger seat distribution, and exits should be located where they afford the most effective means of passenger evacuation. The current regulations also state that no passenger emergency exit shall be located more than 60 feet from any adjacent passenger exit on the same side of the same deck of the fuselage. Type A floor level exits are required to have an escape passageway at least 36" wide. In addition, the assist means for each Type A exit must be self-supporting, and must be capable of simultaneously carrying two parallel lines of evacuees.
In a study conducted by the NTSB of passengers and crew involved in 46 evacuations, all of the 67 floor level exits used, were opened without difficulty during these evacuations 8 . This suggests that providing there is no deformation to the structure of the exit or door frame there are unlikely to be exit operational problems in the event of an emergency. In general, passengers were able to access exits without difficulty except for one accident in which the interior cabin furnishings became dislodged and were obstacles to some passengers' access to exits. There are no known reports of accidents in which the size of a floor level exit caused problems for passenger egress (in contrast to Type III exits where this has been a problem and on which extensive research has been conducted 1,4 ).
Accident severity can influence the ease with which passengers will be able to reach an exit. Severe damage to the fuselage, for example, can cause interior furnishings to be dislodged and become obstacles for passengers attempting to exit an aeroplane. In the MD-82 accident in Little Rock, Arkansas 8 , the crash forces caused seats to break free from their seat tracks and block aisles. In the forward portion of the cabin, passengers had to navigate around fallen overhead bins and across a severely deformed floor. Fortunately, the crash caused several gaps in the fuselage that passengers were able to use for egress.
Other factors which have been reported to restrict the ability of passengers to access operational exits have included broken interiors, overhead bins, the seatback in front of them and aisle width. In addition, flight attendants have reported instances where either their seat or galley items obstructed the evacuation. Since, in the majority of accidents, passengers have been able to access operational exits without difficulty, the size and location of exits in the future VLTAs will require consideration but are unlikely to cause difficulties.
Location and Size of Aisles and Cross Aisles
The regulations state that there must be a passageway leading from the nearest main aisle to each floor level emergency exit 6, 7 . Each passageway leading to a floor level exit must be unobstructed and at least 36 inches wide. If two or more main aisles are provided, there must be unobstructed cross-aisles at least 20 inches wide between main aisles. Passenger aisles within the cabin should be a minimum width of 15 inches at less than 25 inches from the floor and a minimum width of 20 inches at 25 inches and more above the floor.
In the accident which happened in the UK at Manchester airport in 1985 1 the accident investigators concluded that the bulkheads at the front of the cabin had severely restricted the ability of some passengers to access the exits at the front of the airframe.
The research which was conducted in the UK following the Manchester Accident 4 clearly indicated that when the aperture between the bulkheads at the front of the cabin was increased from 20 inches to 30 inches, the speed of passengers able to pass through the aperture was significantly increased. Making the gap even wider did not significantly increase the flow rate and on occasions led to problems. These included the occurrence of the flight attendant being pushed out through the exit by the rush of passengers at the start of the evacuation (an occurrence which has also occurred in some accidents) because she had no bulkhead to protect her . This is a factor which should be taken into account in the design of the cabin adjacent to the exits in future large aircraft. The other problem was that in dense smoke, the passengers tended to hesitate when they got to the end of the aisle and found that there was no easy hand-hold between the end of the aisle and the exit aperture. By contrast, when there was only a small bulkhead they were able to feel this with their hands and use this to enable them to guide themselves to the exit. These findings may have implications for the design and location of the monuments in future VLTAs.
There do not appear to be reports of the cross-aisles in the currently configured wide-bodied airframes causing problems during either evacuation certification tests or in evacuations in an actual emergency. If it was possible to establish dual flows down the cabin aisles, this could significantly improve the evacuation rate. If exits are located at the end of each aisle, and not hidden behind a bulkhead, passengers would then leave their seats, move into the aisle and immediately be able to see an operational exit. This may increase the speed of their progress down the aisle in an emergency.
Individual Cabin Capacity Limitations
The regulated UK minimum space requirements for seated passengers are contained within the CAA regulations 9 . These regulations were developed based on anthropometric data for 5th percentile females and 95th percentile males, and also took into account the minimum distance and the vertically projected distance between any seat, and the seat (or other fixed structure) immediately in front of it.
Currently the minimum distance required between the back support cushion of a seat and the back of the seat in front (the seat pitch) is 26". In addition, the minimum distance between a seat and the seat (or other fixed structure in front) is 7", and the minimum vertically projected distance between seat rows is 3". These minima were originally set in order to provide adequate space for passengers to both occupy a seat, and to stand and vacate the seat in order to move to the main aisle. While these standards have recently been reviewed in a study conducted for the Joint Aviation Authorities 10 , there have as yet been no regulatory changes based on this research.
In principle, there would appear to be no reason why the regulations regarding seat pitch and seating density for wide-bodied aircraft should be any different on a VLTA airframe. The key consideration should be the evacuation performance, and ensuring that this can be achieved to a satisfactory standard in all circumstances.
Sill Heights for VLTAs
It is anticipated that future VLTAs might have Type A exits and a sill height of 5 metres at the lower deck and 8 metres at the upper deck. In order to achieve a rapid evacuation of all of the passengers in an emergency it is essential that the time passengers take to jump onto the slide is kept to an absolute minimum. Reports from airline operators in company training schools indicate that as the height of the sill increases, hesitation time before jumping onto the slide also tends to increase. Over the course of an evacuation of an airframe, passengers hesitating can significantly increase the overall evacuation time.
Research has shown that the most effective method to overcome the tendency by passengers to hesitate, or in some instances to sit rather than to jump onto the slide is to ensure that all of the flight attendants are trained to act assertively 11 . In addition, anything which can be achieved by improvements to the slide design to encourage passengers to feel more confident and to overcome their natural tendency to hesitate will be of benefit.
Slides and Post Egress Factors
The Emergency Evacuation Slides Technical Standard Order 12 states that all slides must be capable of demonstrating rates of at least 70 passengers per minute, per lane. Therefore, for dual lane slides, the chutes must be capable of supporting a flow rate of 140 passengers per minute. In full-scale evacuation demonstrations, as with experimental evacuations and evacuation models, the actual flow rate obtained will depend on many factors. (see Size, Location and Access to Exits).
Previous studies have indicated that injuries during egress are frequently associated with the use of the slide. The reasons for these include: the airframe coming to rest at an unlevel attitude making some of the slides too short; severe weather conditions e.g. strong winds making the slide use hazardous; passengers endeavouring to use the slide before it is fully deployed; passengers falling off the side of the slide, or sustaining injuries either during their descent or at the bottom of the slide. The design of the escape slides will therefore require serious consideration in order to minimise the potential for injuries to passengers. Research is being undertaken at the University of Newcastle into alternate slide design 13 .
Many of the reported injuries which have been associated with the use of slides have, in fact, occurred as a consequence of congestion at the bottom of the slides. The development of some new technology or new procedures for marshalling passengers away from the airframe following an evacuation may be beneficial for future VLTAs.
Following emergency evacuations we have tragically had instances of numbers of passengers and occasionally crew who have successfully evacuated the aircraft but have subsequently sustained serious injury or loss of life. There have been instances of passengers being run over by rescue personnel arriving at the scene of the accident. On one occasion some of the passengers reboarded the aircraft to search for missing hand luggage and were overcome by a fire which broke out in the cabin while they were on board. It is frequently not possible to trace all of the passengers who have been on board the aircraft following an accident. All of these factors indicate the importance of designing procedures for handling such a large number of passengers, post evacuation, in such a way that their safety can be assured.
Emergency Exit Lighting
The regulatory authorities require that an emergency lighting system, independent of the main lighting system, must be installed on aeroplanes. The emergency lighting system must include the following: illuminated emergency exit marking and locating signs; sources of general cabin illumination; interior lighting in emergency exit areas; floor proximity escape path marking; and exterior emergency lighting 6, 7 The effectiveness of the emergency lighting systems was reviewed by the NTSB 14 . Of the 36 flight attendants who responded, there were only two reports of failed lights, both from flight attendants in the Little Rock accident 8 . Further, 5 flight crew members and 10 flight attendants reported that emergency lighting systems assisted evacuations in which visibility was restricted. All of these crew members were involved in five night evacuations. The Safety Board concluded, therefore, that emergency lighting systems functioned as intended in the 30 evacuation cases investigated in detail., This supports the case for the continued use of emergency lighting to assist passengers evacuate in smoke in VLTAs.
Access to Upper Deck
Passenger access to the upper deck for loading and unloading in normal circumstances can be satisfactorily achieved using a pair of dual-lane staircases. The extent to which these may be available for use in various aircraft emergencies will require careful consideration.
Novel Interiors
The suggestion has been made that in future VLTAs, some operators may request novel configurations including recreational and exercise areas. If these are to be introduced, the safety implications for their use in flight will require special consideration, especially with respect to turbulence. However it will be assumed that all passengers will be required to be seated in a normal 16g seat for take-off and landing or in the event of a pre-warned emergency. The same will apply for the use of beds by passengers or crew.
A recent development on a wide-bodied airframe has included a lower lobe below the main deck in order to provide additional toilet facilities. Again it must be assumed that these will be unavailable for take-off or landing or in the event of an emergency. While the proposed facility meets the airworthiness, design and certification criteria in the Joint Aviation Requirements, UK CAA noted that there is no recent in-service experience of passenger use of lower-lobe compartments and that the potential operational problems are significant. Potential operational problems could include issues of passenger control and monitoring, fire watch, decompression, medical emergency response and turbulence.
Crew Factors
The cabin crew issues for future VLTAs will include:
Numbers of Flight Attendants
There is now extensive evidence from both research 11 and from accidents 14 that the flight attendants can be the most important determinant of the successful evacuation of all of the passengers in an emergency.
The usual maximum number of passengers per flight attendant is 50:1. However Scandinavian Airlines fly with one flight attendant per 30 passengers and indeed many other operators fly with more than the minimum number. It should be recognised, however, that those operators who fly with additional crew usually do so for reasons of service as well as safety. Future aircraft designs, with multiaisles and large number of passengers, raise the question of whether a ratio of one flight attendant per 50 passengers is adequate. This is perhaps another reason why a performance standard would be helpful, as it would then be possible to determine by testing how many flight attendants will be required, and in which locations.
Flight Attendant Assist Space
When the video tapes for certification evacuations are closely inspected, it becomes apparent that the size of the adequate assist space can on occasions lead to the flight attendants being unable to stay in the assist space when they are assisting the passengers to evacuate in quick succession down the slides. Thus the current size of the adequate assist space on some airframes can cause the flight attendant to inadvertently interrupt the continuous dual lane slide usage. By increasing the size of the assist space and relocating the grab handle it may be possible to enable the flight assistants to provide sufficient assistance to the passengers to ensure that there is continuous dual lane slide use.
Direct View
The regulations currently require all of the flight attendants to have an unrestricted view of the passengers in the cabin when seated for take-off or landing. This requirement may influence the location of the seating for the flight attendants.
The question of flight attendant stations with a direct view into the cabin has been debated over many years. To flight attendant representatives this has seemed an obvious requirement necessary for safety. The rationale is that during critical phases of flight, flight attendants are required to be seated at their emergency stations. However, despite the presence of warning signs in the cabin to make passengers remain seated in a safe position during critical phases of flight, passengers do not always respect these cabin signs. There have been numerous instances of passengers attempting to pick up their belongings from overhead bins on final approach, standing up during taxiing and putting their carry-on baggage into the aisle. In the event of an emergency landing, passengers often tend to leave their brace for impact position as soon as the aircraft is on the ground. Flight attendants need to visually monitor these situations to prevent this from happening. Flight attendants monitoring the cabin from their emergency stations can have a preventive effect. However, passengers do break the safety rules and it is sometimes necessary for cabin crew to relay instructions over a public address system, by megaphone, or simply by shouting. There is now clear agreement that flight attendants need to be able to monitor the cabin, especially during critical phases of flight. The increased passenger load in future very large transport aircraft will make this issue even more important.
Injuries to Flight Attendants
In a study to investigate the sources of injury to flight attendants and passengers in flight 14 , it was found that the main causes were injuries as a consequence of lack of stability of the aircraft in turbulence, trolleys going out of control, passenger luggage or safety equipment falling from overhead bins, and in-flight fires. With the increased size and numbers of passengers in future VLTAs, it will be important that consideration is given to ways of minimising the injuries which can arise from these sources.
Passenger Factors
In order to achieve the rapid evacuation of all the passengers, the following areas will require consideration:
Provision of safety information for passengers
The regulations 15 require that passenger carrying aeroplane operators shall ensure that all passengers are orally briefed by the appropriate crew member before take-off. This briefing should include restrictions on smoking, the location of the emergency exits, the operation of safety belts and oxygen masks, including where to use them, and the location and use of any required flotation means. In addition, each passenger carrying operator shall provide a safety card in a convenient location for use by each passenger. This card shall supplement the oral briefing and should contain diagrams of, and methods of operating, the emergency exits, and other instructions necessary for the use of emergency equipment.
Passenger performance in an evacuation is influenced by the extent of their preparation for such an eventuality. A large part of this preparedness is their knowledge of exit location and operation, which is normally by information provided either by the oral briefing or by the safety card. There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that passengers do not pay attention to this safety information. For example, the recent NTSB Safety Study 8 examined 46 evacuations, sending questionnaires to all passengers involved. Of 457 passengers who returned questionnaires, 54% (246 people) reported that they had not watched the entire briefing because they had seen it before. Of 431 passengers who answered the question relating to the safety card, 68% (293 people) said that they had not read it. Furthermore, even those passengers who do read the safety card may not necessarily understand all of it. In a recent study, 36 pictorial diagrams randomly chosen from 50 safety cards were presented to 113 people. 20 of these 36 diagrams were understood by less than 50% of those tested 16 . As a result, the NTSB has recommended that the FAA require minimum comprehension testing standards for safety briefing cards. The preparation of the safety briefing and cards for passengers on VLTAs will require careful consideration.
Situational Awareness for Passengers
When passengers board an aircraft and become seated in the cabin, it is essential that they are quickly and without undue effort able to build a mental model of the cabin and their location relative to their nearest exits. One of the issues which will need to be addressed is what form of briefing will ensure that passengers are able to develop a mental model of a VLTA airframe which is sufficiently accurate to enable them to proceed immediately and rapidly to their nearest available exit in the event of an emergency requiring a rapid evacuation of the cabin. threat to the safety of the aeroplane. A limited amount of research has been undertaken into this problem but our knowledge to-date is scarce and in many instances hypothetical.
Disruptive Behaviour by Passengers

In-flight Medical Emergencies
In-flight medical emergencies are becoming another area of increasing concern. Obviously as aircraft get bigger and more people fly it is only to be expected that the numbers will increase. However, whereas the industry put enormous effort and resources into ensuring the health of the airframe (safety) with the consequent dramatic reduction in the accident rate, relative little attention has been paid to the medical health of passengers in flight. The criteria for the design of the cabin interior and for the cabin environment have not changed significantly for over two decades. By contrast, the demographics of passengers have changed enormously over the equivalent time period. The average height and weight of the population in Europe and in North America has increased. In addition we also have a large percentage of the population choosing to fly when they are past retirement age and not necessarily in good health. The other relevant factor is that with the increased performance capability of the modern airframe passengers can fly continuously for up to 18 or 19 hours. It may be that in the future, in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of medical emergencies in flight, further consideration will have to given to the cabin environment, seat design and seat pitch.
Future Issues
Precautionary Evacuations
The sill height of the current generation of wide-bodied airframes (e.g. 747, A340) is approximately 5 metres. This will be the height of the lower deck of a VLTA. The upper deck will have a sill height of 5 metres. A few passengers have sustained serious injuries during evacuations from a sill height of 5 metres both in the event of fires, in precautionary evacuations and even in certification tests. There is little information on the injury rate which may be sustained when the sill height is increased from 5 to 8 metres. The majority of aircraft evacuations are in fact precautionary evacuations. The public may be prepared to tolerate a small number of serious injuries from slides in the event of an aircraft fire. Were the number of serious injuries to increase, especially in precautionary evacuations, this could lead the public to lose confidence in the airframe.
Threat from Fire
The fact that when the smoke from a fire enters the cabin it can have such catastrophic consequences is a concern, with so many passengers in the cabin. The first approach must be to explore whether with these larger airframes, additional safeguards can be designed into the fuselage to reduce the probability of the smoke entering the cabin. Another consideration could be the introduction of some form of cabin water mist system to reduce the rate at which the smoke can spread through the cabin.
Enhanced Directional Information
One of the challenges for the future is that as airframes become bigger there will be an increasing demand for innovation which will assist passengers to locate available exits and to access them quickly even in the presence of smoke in the cabin. Recent innovations in the UK which are currently being used to assist members of the public to evacuate from buildings in the event of a fire have included electroluminescent way guidance systems incorporating tactile cues 17 , photoluminescent or "glow in the dark" way guidance, and directional noise 18 . These systems could merit further exploration. Another possibility might be to explore whether the currently used lighting, signs and floor proximity systems are currently being employed to maximum advantage. It could be that changes to their location or in the case of luminescent material, the size of the area which they cover could make a difference
Emergency Command and Control Procedures
The procedures currently used by flight attendants for an emergency evacuation have been carefully developed and standardised. Following the call to evacuate, each attendant is required to independently assess the situation outside their exit and if the conditions are acceptable open the exit and once the slide has deployed, assist the passengers to evacuate onto the slide as rapidly as possible. It is only when there are no longer passengers to evacuate that they can consider the situation in the rest of the cabin and whether there may be other passengers left inside. If, upon inspection, the flight attendant finds the external conditions are such that it will be unsafe to evacuate through their exit, they must then redirect their passengers to the nearest operational exit. These procedures were originally developed when aeroplanes were relatively small and attendants could hear and see each other relatively easily.
As airframes become larger, consideration should be given to whether or not these procedures continue to be adequate. The practice in other scenarios where large numbers of people are required to evacuate quickly in the event of a fire (e.g. football stadiums, oil rigs) is that a commander works at a control station and manages the evacuation in order to ensure that all of the escape opportunities are used to maximum advantage. With the advent of new technologies (e.g. small video recorders, mobile phones) it should be possible for a commander to have a small control station from which they can monitor the conditions inside and outside the cabin. They can then provide additional information to the attendants at the exits as required. The control station could be located immediately outside the flight deck so that the evacuation commander can have easy access to the captain of the aircraft. Such a system could also be of benefit in the event of medical emergencies, in-flight fires, hijack, etc. Another possibility would be to introduce some technology beside each exit so that the flight attendant can see at a glance which of the other exits on the airframe are operational.
Terrorism
Air marshals are now part of the crew on all US carriers and may soon be included on carriers of other nationalities. The issues of their roles and responsibilities, and the extent to which they will interact or assist the cabin crew in the event of an accident involving a rapid emergency evacuation of the cabin will require careful consideration. There will be implications for training of both marshals and cabin crew.
Conclusions
VLTAs will be an important and exciting development in civil aviation. The factors which may influence the safety of passengers in VLTA configurations in an emergency have been reviewed. The information from relevant accidents, research and safety data provide knowledge which can be applied to the future VLTA cabin designs in order to enhance the safety of passengers. For the certification of the airframe, agreement will be required with the regulatory authorities on the approach which is to be taken. In view of the numbers of passengers and, as a consequence, the potential for injury, consideration could be given to the use of a combination of modelling and partial testing rather than a full scale-evacuation test.
